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DRAFT
13 December 1973

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/11[1]

Security Committee

(Effective _____)

The Intelligence Community's security policies and procedures must serve the DCI efforts to improve the quality, scope and timeliness of the community's product and to achieve an efficient use of resources involved in the protection of foreign intelligence and foreign intelligence sources and methods.[2] Therefore, pursuant to provisions of Subsection 102 (d) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended and to provisions of NSCID 1, a new standing Committee of USIB is hereby established.

1. Name of the Committee

The committee will be known as the Security Committee

2. Mission

The mission of the committee is to provide the means by which the Director of Central Intelligence, with the advice of members of the United States Intelligence Board, can:

1/ Supercedes DCID 1/11, effective 23 April 1965 and DCID 1/12 effective 23 September 1964

2/ The term intelligence as used in this document applies only to information pursuant to statute Executive Order, or other authority consonent with the DCI's statutory responsibility for the protection of foreign intelligence and foreign intelligence sources and methods.

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a. Ensure the development and review of security standards, procedures and practices for the protection of foreign intelligence and foreign intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;

b. Keep under review standards and procedures for the dissemination and security protection of foreign intelligence material;

c. Develop standards and review procedures for the release of U.S. holdings of foreign intelligence to foreign governments;

d. Review special security and compartmentation procedures and recommend any necessary changes to achieve optimum use of intelligence consistent with protection of sensitive intelligence sources and methods;

e. Establish procedures for review by intelligence authorities of all classified intelligence information proposed for use in unclassified activities in the course of which there is danger that intelligence sources and methods might be revealed.

3. Functions

The functions of the committee are:

a. To advise and assist the DCI as appropriate with respect to the establishment of security policies and procedures

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including recommendations for legislation for the protection of foreign intelligence and foreign intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

b. Review, formulate and recommend to the DCI personnel, physical and document security standards and practices applicable to all Government departments and agencies and their contractors as such standards and practices related to the protection of foreign intelligence sources and methods in consideration of the effectiveness, risks and cost factors involved.

c. To review, formulate, and recommend to the DCI policies and procedures governing the release to the public, to foreign governments and international organizations of foreign intelligence including classified military intelligence with attention to insuring that the release to foreign governments is consonant with U.S. policy and results in net advantage to the United States and to insuring further that the intelligence itself is afforded a degree of protection equal to that afforded by the United States.

d. To call upon, on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence, the departments and agencies, as appropriate to investigate within their department or agency any unauthorized disclosure or compromise of foreign intelligence or of foreign

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intelligence sources and methods; and to report the results of these investigations to the DCI, through USIB. Such reports will include (1) an assessment of the impact on the U.S. intelligence process and any foreseeable implications to national security or relations with foreign countries as a result of use of the information gained through the unauthorized disclosure; (2) corrective measures taken or needed within departments and agencies involved in order to prevent such disclosures in the future or to minimize the adverse effects of the case at hand; and (3) recommendations concerning any appropriate additional actions.

e. The functions of the Security Committee as they relate to technical security countermeasures, computer security and special security compartmentation are set forth in attachments 1, 2, and 3.

4. Community Responsibilities

a. Upon request of the committee chairman, USIB departments and agencies shall furnish to the committee within established security safeguards particular information materials, and ad hoc temporary personnel support needed by the committee and pertinent to its functions.

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b. Each USIB member is responsible for investigation of any unauthorized disclosure or compromise of foreign intelligence or foreign intelligence sources and methods occurring within his department or agency. When investigation determines that the possibility of compromise cannot be discounted, and the interests of the USIB or another USIB member are involved or affected, the results of investigation will be forwarded to the Security Committee for review and possible remedial action as determined appropriate by the committee.

5. Composition and Organization

a. The committee will consist of a full-time chairman designated by the DCI, representatives of the chiefs of departments and agencies who are members of the USIB, and representatives of the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The chairman may invite a representative of the chief of any other department or agency having functions related to matters being considered by the committee to sit with the committee whenever matters within the purview of that department or agency are to be discussed.

b. The committee will be supported by subcommittees as approved by the DCI and ad hoc working groups as approved by the chairman. The chairmen of subcommittees will be designated by the committee chairman with the concurrence of the DCI. Membership

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on the subcommittees and ad hoc working groups need not be limited to member agencies of the committee, but may be extended by the chairman to representation of other departments and agencies having related functional reponsibilities or support capabilities.

c. The committee will have a full-time support staff to be provided by USIB departments and agencies as arranged and approved by the DCI.

6. Rules of Procedure

a. The committee shall meet upon the call of the chairman or at the request of any of its members. Items may be placed on the agenda by the DCI or by the chairman or any member of the committee.

b. Decisions or recommendations will be formulated by the chairman after giving consideration to the views of the members. At the request of a dissenting member, the chairman will refer the decision or recommendation along with dissenting opinion or opinions to the DCI.

W. E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence

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DRAFT DCID 1/11
(Attachment 1)
Technical Surveillance Countermeasures

The functions of the Security Committee include:

A. With respect to general technical surveillance countermeasures:

(1) To facilitate the formulation, development and application of effective countermeasures equipment and techniques based on assessments by the Central Intelligence Agency and other knowledgeable member agencies of USIB of (a) the state of the art of audio surveillance equipment, and (b) the known and estimated technical surveillance capabilities of foreign governments.

(2) To formulate and recommend to the DCI resource programming objectives for USIB departments and agencies in the field of technical surveillance countermeasures in consideration of current and foreseen threats and with regard for the effective and efficient use of resources.

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(3) To coordinate all aspects of the U. S. Government effort in defense against technical surveillance penetration and to resolve conflicts that may arise in connection therewith.

(4) To facilitate the interchange of information in the field of technical surveillance countermeasures among USIB departments and agencies and others as appropriate, particularly by the preparation, publication and dissemination of appropriate reports, notices and guides.

(5) To recommend policies governing disclosures concerning technical surveillance devices (except as otherwise provided for under NSCID No. 5), or countermeasures thereto, to be made to foreign governments or international organizations in which the U. S. Government participates.

(6) To advise USIB departments and agencies of technical surveillance countermeasures objectives and standards to be considered in connection with existing or new facilities abroad.

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(7) To prepare damage assessments by furnishing reports of known or suspected hostile audio surveillance penetrations of U.S. facilities and recommending remedial or other actions as appropriate.

(8) To evaluate the curriculum and operations

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of, and to provide policy guidance

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of common concern for the training in technical surveillance countermeasures of USIB and other U.S. Government department and agency personnel.

(9) To evaluate technically the foreign technical surveillance and foreign technical surveillance countermeasures believed to be employed or capable of employment against U.S. installations or personnel.

B. With respect to audio countermeasures:

(1) To recommend to USIB departments and agencies and others as appropriate, and to coordinate the execution of, procedures for implementation of policies in the technical surveillance countermeasures

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field.

(2) To develop and recommend to the DCI standard security practices for use by U.S. Government agencies and departments for defense against technical surveillance penetration, including standards for the security indoctrination of U.S. personnel and coordinated training for technical inspectors.

(3) To ensure prompt notification of the chairman by USIB departments and agencies of the discovery or suspected presence of clandestine technical surveillance devices in U.S. installations, including formation on the possibility of exploitation.

C. With respect to countermeasures research and development:

(1) To foster an aggressive and imaginative program of research and development leading to improved technical surveillance countermeasures equipment and techniques.

(2) To coordinate research and development programs in the technical countermeasures field, particularly to ensure an effective exchange of information and to avoid unwarranted duplication.

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DRAFT DCID 1/11
(Attachment 2)
Computer Security

The functions of the Security Committee include:

(1) To review, formulate and recommend to the DCI policies, standards, and procedures to protect intelligence data stored or processed by computer.

(2) To advise and assist the DCI, the Intelligence Community Staff, Committees of the United States Intelligence Board, USIB member agencies and departments, and other intelligence users with respect to all computer security issues and to resolve conflicts that may arise in connection therewith.

(3) To formulate and recommend to the DCI resource programming objectives for USIB departments and agencies in the field of computer security in consideration of current and foreseen vulnerabilities and threats and with regard for

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the effective and efficient use of resources; to foster and to monitor an aggressive program of computer security research and development in the Intelligence Community in order to avoid unwarranted duplication and to assure the pursuit of an effective effort at resolving technical problems associated with the protection of computer operations.

(4) To coordinate all aspects of Intelligence Community efforts in defense against hostile penetration of Community computer systems and as feasible to support other Government and national efforts aimed at improving computer security technology; to foster and to coordinate Intelligence Community computer security training and indoctrination activities.

(5) To facilitate within the Intelligence Community the exchange of information relating to computer security threats, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures by providing a focal point for the evaluation of foreign intentions and capabilities to exploit Community computer operations, for

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central notification of hostile exploitation attempts, for the preparation of damage assessments of incidents of foreign exploitation of intelligence computer operations, and for the formulation of Community policy on the release of computer security information to foreign governments and international organizations.

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13 December 1973

EXPLANATORY NOTES
13 December 1973 Draft of DCID 1/11

1. On 7 November the draft DCID 1/11 on the Security Committee was remanded to the Committee for review and resubmission to the USIB. At its November 1973 meeting, the Security Committee tasked the Chairman to rewrite the draft DCID 1/11. This has now been completed. The rewrite was prepared following due consideration of all comments made by members of the Committee, General Counsel, CIA, members of the Intelligence Community Staff and the DCI in his response to previous drafts of the DCID 1/11 as prepared by the IC Staff.

2. This memorandum attempts to reconcile the various positions and to set forth those considerations which lead to the current form of the DCID 1/11. Attached are various notes and memoranda that may be of assistance to the members in appreciation of some of the reasons for the changes that have been adopted.

3. It is believed that comments are in order about what occasioned the initial rewrite of DCID 1/11 and the actions that followed on the original concept which resulted in a DCID being

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proposed for USIB consideration without detailed community coordination. The following then is background which was considered in preparing the current version of the DCID 1/11.

(a) NSCID 1, effective 17 February 1973 clearly tasked the DCI with reviewing and developing security standards. It tasked the USIB to advise the DCI with respect to the supervision of the dissemination and security of intelligence material. It tasked each department and agency to remain responsible for the protection of intelligence within its own organization and charged them to establish appropriate internal policies and procedures to prevent unauthorized disclosures. It gave the DCI authority to call upon the departments and agencies as appropriate to investigate within their agency any unauthorized disclosure and requires them to transmit a report of these investigations to the DCI. NSCID 1 also charges the DCI to establish procedures for review by intelligence authorities of classified intelligence proposed for release to the public where there might be damage of revelation of sources and methods.

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(b) In February 1973 Mr. Helms had most of the DCID's reviewed and redrafted to take into consideration the tenets of the February 1972 NSCID 1. The DCID on the Security Committee and the DCID on the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee were included in the review. They were redrafted and apparently coordinated with the USIB agencies by the drafter before being submitted to the DCI. Since Mr. Helms was about to depart, he did not promulgate the new DCID 's, but had them held for Dr. Schlesinger who took no action.

(c) In September 1973 the Intelligence Community Staff provided Mr. Colby a summary report titled "Intelligence Community Security Problems" (copy attached at TAB A). The report notes that security policies and procedures are administered by fragmented and dispersed authorities, lack consistency in application, may limit the flow of needed information and may be internally inconsistent. The report concentrates on problems of compartmentation, release of intelligence to foreign governments and technical surveillance countermeasures. The report concludes that the community's security

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policies and procedures are an impediment to the DCI efforts to improve quality, scope and timeliness of intelligence products; observes that there is no centralized body in the intelligence community with authority to address community-wide security problems of broad scope, to study, formulate and monitor implementation of new security procedures; and that needs in this line can be facilitated by reconstituting the Security Committee with a full time Chairman and staff and assignment of broader functions including the mission of the TSCC. The report recommended action to ths end.

STAT (d) On 26 September 1973, [redacted] forwarded a revision of the DCID 1/11 to the DCI. In his covering memorandum he recommended the DCI circulate the proposed new DCID to USIB principals and early inclusion as a USIB agenda item. (We do not have a copy of the initial draft but a copy of Dr.

STAT [redacted] cover memo is attached at TAB B). Mr.

STAT Colby responded to [redacted] n 2 October 1973 with suggestions for some revisions. Mr. Colby recommended that the draft DCID 1/11 "should also

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cover

(1) Reference to NSCID/1 re protection of intelligence sources and methods.

(2) Secrecy agreements and employee clearances where possible (including polygraph).

(3) Executive Order 11652 re classification and declassification procedures especially periodic review, Freedom of Information Act, etc."

(A copy of Mr. Colby's note is attached at TAB C.)

(e) On 11 October General Graham sent Mr. Colby a memorandum covering a draft revised to respond to Mr. Colby's note of 2 October. General Graham points out that specific mention of Executive Order 11652 and the Freedom of Information Act is not made on advice of a member of the CIA Office of Legislative Counsel so as to reduce the need for revision of the DCID if such authorities are revised. General Graham informs that a new paragraph 3. a. (4) was added to the first draft to deal more specificially with the personnel security matters referred to by Mr. Colby. General Graham says that "Security-related obligations and conditions of employment" refer to security oaths and

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and secrecy agreements. "Scientific evaluation methodology" embraces polygraph examinations and psychological testing. General Graham states further that other provisions in the redraft satisfy some of Mr. Colby's other suggestions. The recommendation is made that the proposed new DCID be sent to USIB principals and placed on an early agenda. Mr. Colby indicated his approval of this recommendation. (A copy of the memorandum from General Graham is attached at TAB D along with a copy of the DCID 1/11.) The DCID 1/11 was scheduled for discussion at the 8 November USIB meeting.

(f) The DCID 1/11 was discussed at a pre-USIB meeting on 6 November 1973. Discussion between

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General Jack Thomas of the IC Staff and

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CIA member of the Security Committee resulted in General Thomas recommending and the DCI approving that the paper be taken off the 8 November USIB agenda and remanded to the Security Committee for review and resubmission to USIB. A memorandum for the Chairman, Security Committee from General Thomas on 7 November 1973 conveys this action. (A copy of the remanding memorandum is attached at TAB E.)

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(g) In anticipation of a requirement for early Security Committee action on the DCID 1/11, members were asked to come to the Security Committee meeting of 13 November with written comments on the 11 October draft DCID 1/11. CIA, NSA, DIA and Navy submitted written comments (TAB F) which should be read in connection with the current revision of DCID 1/11. The Committee in general was in agreement that the draft DCID 1/11 was too long and posed problems of authorities in some areas. The Chairman assigned the task of rewriting the DCID to the CIA member.

6. General approach to redrafting the DCID 1/11.

(a) The writers of the draft elected to exercise an attempt at brevity and sacrificed much of the specific terminology noted in the previous draft dated 11 October 1973.

(b) The CIA Special Assistant on USIB matters recommended that USIB members be given some introduction on the philosophy and concepts behind this change. In satisfaction of this recommendation the writers included an opening statement to the effect

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that security policies must serve the DCI efforts to improve quality, scope, and timeliness of intelligence products. The writers refer the members of the Security to the 24 November 1973 paper titled "Intelligence Community Security Problems, a Summary Report", in further explanation of the philosophy behind the current action.

(c) The writers agree with the Committee that in some areas the language is too broad and they attempted to be more precise. In areas of doubt or conflicting recommendations as to appropriate terminology, the writers fell back on the language of NSCID 1 or Executive Order 11652.

(d) The current discussion of the meaning of "intelligence" has resulted in the desire to assure separation between "domestic" and "foreign" interests. The writers agree entirely with the intent to separate the fields of interests. Unfortunately, the writers found that the use of the term "foreign intelligence" was inappropriate in some syntax and elected to employ a footnote as the best manner of handling this problem. Hence, "intelligence" as used herein

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applies only to information pursuant to statute, executive order, or other authority in consonance with the DCI's statutory responsibility for the protection of sources and methods. The writers believe that current Congressional deliberations may provide acceptable terminology which should be adopted at the time it is promulgated for general use.

(e) The statement of Mission was provided as appears herein by the DCI/IC Staff. The writers defer to this authority.

(f) In the statement of Functions:

Para 3 b. The writers believe that the use of the terms "physical, personnel, and document security standards and practices . . ." adequately encompass the intent to address places, people, things, markings, secrecy agreements, polygraph testing, pyschological evaluations, investigative requirements, security indoctrination procedures, access approvals and destruction of classified material as well as all other facets of physical, personnel and document security. The writers believe it has provided sufficient authorities and charges to the Security

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Committee to address all these issues in an orderly, inclusive fashion.

Para 3 c. The writers feel this paragraph is sufficient authority to permit the Committee to address the aspects of classification, declassification, the requirements of Executive Order 11652, the Freedom of Information Act and any results of pending Congressional considerations. The Congressional considerations might result in additional needs for guidance in interpretation but should not force a change in the DCID.

Para 3 e. There were comments for and against the establishment of specific subcommittees in the DCID. The writers acknowledge the obvious advantage of establishing in the basic DCID the identity of specific subcommittees. However, in recognition that the DCID permits the Chairman to be supported by subcommittees as approved by the DCI, it was felt that a much stronger charter could be written for these subcommittees if they were addressed separately by the Chairman, and approved by the DCI. This approach also has the advantage of keeping the DCID relatively short. As an alternative the writers propose

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that details of functions which might serve the Chairman in drafting charters of subcommittees, be included as attachments to the basic DCID 1/11. The writers have contacted the USIB Secretariat and learned that the use of this device is appropriate. The drafters of the DCID would support any proposal to the Chairman that his covering memorandum to the Board reflect the opinion that subcommittees seem strongly indicated in the areas of technical surveillance countermeasures, computer security and compartmentation.

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